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RADAR
IT H A S A S E L F I S H M O T I V E
B y J O H N B I R C H , E . E . M l
PROPAGANDISTS, both Axis and Allied, de-vote considerable time and mental effort to
dreaming up claims for new "secret weapons,"
claims which are very ineffectual against the
enemy.
That one of these dreams became a reality,
however, is now a matter of record. For radar,
the most significant weapon developed in the pres-
ent war to date, underwent the transition from
secrecy to history on May 23 of this year with the
issuance by the Navy of a paper describing its
development.
A vivid testimony of the effectiveness of radar
as a defensive weapon can be obtained from the
German Luftwaffe, a group now richer in experi-
ence, though lesser in number. In 1940, Hitler's
airmen suffered their first defeat at the hands of
the RAF, which was outnumbered 10 to 1. Turn-
ing to night raids for better luck, German bomb-
ers were sought out and destroyed with equal
ease, regardless of altitude. Apparently, the
British were receiving advance notice of the raids
and consequently could concentrate their air-
power to a better advantage. The death rate of
German planes was so high that the invasion of
England had to be postponed indefinitely. For
this civilization-preserving feat, radar was almost
entirely responsible.
The Nazis were wiser as a result of this exper-
ience, of course, but not until it was too late.
They had an inkling of the idea from apparatus
in captured planes, and their findings were con-
firmed on July 17, 1941, when it became absolute-
ly necessary for Lord Beaverbrook to broadcast
an appeal for desperately needed radio techni-
cians for radar servicing. Scraping together
every bit of information they could get their
hands on, the Germans hurriedly built a radar
station on the channel. Upon its completion,
English commandos took it, lock, stock and barrel.
The principles behind this new piece of elec-
tronic thaumaturgy are simple, fundamental, and
have been known for many years. Radar exists
in its most basic form in the bat, which is blind
but "sees" by emitting a very high pitched whistle
which bounces off its surroundings and returns
to its sensitive ears, enabling it to approximate
distances. In actual practice, a receiver and
transmitter of radio waves are the main compon-
ents of the apparatus used, both being necessary
at each station. The transmitter sends out waves
of extremely short wave length (1 to 10 cm.) ; the
waves travel in a straight line, with the speed
of light, until they strike an electricity-conduct-
ing surface. They are then reflected back to the
sending station and are detected in the receiver,
the time for the entire cycle to occur being re-
corded by sensitive instruments. It is then pos-
sible to obtain the distance to the reflecting sur-
face.
Notice that this resembles the well-known echo
effect, but with radio waves involved rather than
sound waves. As with sound waves, the reflecting
body governs the strength and clarity of the echo.
It is surprising, but indeed fortunate, that an
object as small as an airplane could reflect the
signals adequately to make them audible at the
receiving post at a distance of one hundred miles,
but such is the case, and mainly because of two
practices in the modus operandi. First, the very
short wave lengths are used, resulting in a
sharper, more intense reflection. The signal will not
spread out, but will continue to travel in a con-
centrated beam (quasi-optical phenomenon). And
second, by various arrangements of the antenna
wires it is possible to make the waves travel in
any desired direction, which creates the same
effect. With the searching-out signal traveling
in a narrow beam, the direction of the reflecting
airplane can be more accurately obtained.
With radar, it is possible to determine the
number, speed, altitude, and course of approach-
ing planes, but this cannot be done from one unit
alone, (a unit consisting of one transmitter and
one receiver). As the detecting system is set up,
a number of units are used at remote points,
while the recording instruments are all located
at a central control position. In this way, the
results of all the units can be co-ordinated and
utilized in the familiar "triangulation" method
of surveying.
The unerring accuracy of this system was
illustrated tragically at Pearl Harbor. Radar
units had been assigned to the Pacific fleet the
year before, and the station at Pearl Harbor was
being operated by a Pvt. Lockhard. On Dec. 7,
1941, while experimenting with the station, he
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detected a large group of planes approaching 132
miles distant and immediately reported to his
superior officers. They retorted that a large
number of American p l a n e s were due, and
promptly forgot the matter. Fifteen minutes
later, Lockhard observed that the planes were
90 miles away and 50 in number. When a fur-
ther increase in signal strength was noticed, he
again reported, at the risk of insubordination,
and again failed to cause any alarm. Events
that followed are only too well known.
In 1925, two scientists, Kennelly and Heaviside,
found that when radio waves were directed up-
ward, they were reflected back to earth. Their
explanation was that there exists layers of ions
in the statosphere, which reflect the waves. The
device which was designed to measure the height
of these layers became the first efficient radar
set because it overcame an inherent difficulty.
Since the transmitter, for sending out the waves,
and the receiver, for intercepting the reflected
waves, had to be placed rather closely together,
it was only natural that some energy would "leak
out" of the transmitter and go directly over to
the receiver, thus causing interference. The
problem was solved by transmitting the signal
in short pulses, the "dead" space between pulses
being long enough to permit reception of the
reflected signal. The pulse system did not receive
full recognition until 1932.
The development of radar continued slowly in
the 1930's because of lack of money (due to fail-
ure to gain congressional support), and time.
But when a perfected radar unit gave an excellent
account of itself in 1939 on the battleship New
York, the Navy was completely convinced of its
value, and immediately the Bell Telephone and
R.C.A. electronics laboratories organized for
quantity production.
In those days, nations weren't trading scien-
tific secrets, and it wasn't until late in 1940 that
we learned that Great Britain had developed,
independently, radar equipment very similar to
that of the U. S. Navy. Their work was based
on American papers of the late 1920's concerning
the Heaviside layer measurements. Radar is
now being adopted by all the nations taking an
active p&rt in the war.
About radar having a future there is no ques-
tion. The very qualities which make it an inval-
uable wartime weapon will qualify it for un-
dreamed of uses in peacetime. Our trains, super
liners, and high speed planes will be protected by
radar from the increased danger of collision. As-
tronomers will use it to study the moon and plan-
ets. Meterologists will be able to detect cloud
masses thousands of miles away and make more
accurate weather predictions.
Indeed, radar has a selfish motive. It is short-
ening the war by a tremendous, bloodless, amount,
that it may hurry and busy itself with the task
of enlightening the world of tomorrow.
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Transmitters on the assembly floor —Courtesy General Electric.
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